This article for the volume to be published on the occasion of the retirement of Dr. Winternitz as Professor of Pathology is one of the final entries of a journal that was opened under his instruction about thirty-five years ago. Although the writer, as a medical student and resident, had received unforgettably vivid teaching from Dr. Winternitz during the period from 1911 to 1915, the associations with which this article deals began formally in 1916 . In that year, after a few months of training under Dr. Hans Zinsser, I was put in charge of the new Laboratory for Bacteriology on the Fifth Floor which Dr. Winternitz had recently added to the old Pathology Building at the Johns Hopkins Medical School. In the original "protocol" of the experimental program, and of the even more experimental appointment, there was no mention of typhus fever and little, if anything, about medical administration. There were, of course, no indications of the unforseen events of the future. Nevertheless, the apparently accidental arrangements of those days started the series of happenings that finally included the opportunity to take part in the administration of typhus control in World War II. It is now clear that throughout the haphazard occurrences of the years since 1916 a main element in the Fifth Floor protocol, although unwritten, was the influence of Dr. Winternitz's philosophy and conceptions of relationships among people, communities, and ideas. Typhus and typhus control involve these relationships through the natural history of the disease and the social and economic implications of its prevention. Hence, a pupil of Dr. Winternitz working in that field would be especially aware of his influence, as well as of his example and contributions. It is with recollections going back to Baltimore before our country's entry into World War I, with thoughts of unbroken association over the years, and with awareness of his influence that these observations on typhus control in World War II are offered for this volume dedicated to Dr. Winternitz.
The word "commentary" in the title of this paper is intended to mean an attempt to generalize from specific instances and to venture a few opinions and speculative remarks relative to the control of louse-borne, exanthematic typhus fever that was achieved during World War II. Details and documentation might well be demanded by the reader. Fortunately, the scientific work, outlines of the administrative arrangements, and descriptions of the main episodes have been published. The few selected references1'-at the end of this article must serve as a guide to the larger literature. The whole undertaking, however, was such a vast collaboration of individuals and agencies in democratic nations engaged in a total war effort that neither documentation nor adequate acknowledgement is possible in a paper of this sort. An article published in 1948' contained names and mention of many individuals and military and civilian agencies that were devoted to this collaboration. It is admittedly incomplete. A full account is planned for publication in a volume connected with the medical history of the war. Meanwhile, the writer begs the informed reader to fill in the details and also to understand that while his immediate opportunity to participate in this work came from connection with the Army, he is fully aware of all associations with other Services and agencies.
Two main conclusions have been drawn from the results of the attack against typhus during the war. One is that American troops were effectively protected against typhus. The other is that epidemics of typhus fever among civilian populations were brought under control and stopped. It is of some interest to examine both claims.
During the war, from 1941 to 1945, there were only 64 cases of epidemic, louse-borne typhus fever among American troops and no deaths. The chief specific preventive measures employed among troops were those directed against louse infestation and procedures for the establishment and maintenance of immunity by injections of typhus vaccine. Contributory general preventive measures were those of personal hygiene, cleanliness, good nutrition, proper housing when available, avoidance of contact with known sources of infection, and education. The average age group of the troops was a favorable element against fatality, but their previous lack of exposure to typhus had given them no opportunity to acquire immunity naturally. Where so many general factors are contributing to a final result it is difficult to assess the value of specific measures. However, it appears possible to do so with regard to anti-louse measures and vaccination against typhus.
With regard to the value of anti-louse measures in protection against typhus no question of principle was raised or has been raised. Since 1909, when Nicolle proved that the body louse transmitted epidemic typhus among human beings, it has been obvious that prevention of infestation with lice and delousing of the infested would prevent the spread of typhus. Thus the prevention of louse-infestation by the use of insecticidal powder became not only a safeguard of troops against typhus but also a revolutionary advance in the control of epidemics of typhus among civilians.
For the appraisal of the value of a vaccine there is no formula as simple as the one used in the section on delousing where it could be said that freedom from lice meant practical freedom from typhus. Since many variables and intangible factors were involved, it is more difficult to estimate the actual efficacy of vaccination against typhus.
By the end of 1941 there was ample evidence from the work of Weigl, Zinsser, Cox, and others that animals and human beings could be made resistant to typhus infection by injections of suspensions of killed Rickettsia prowazeki. This was sufficient to warrant the adoption of typhus vaccina-tion by the Army late in 1941. The first preparation used in 1942 was the Cox yolk sac vaccine. It was known that the original Cox vaccine was not as good an antigen as desirable. Hence individual and collaborative efforts were stimulated to produce a better vaccine. Great improvements were made in 1942 by the ether extraction method discovered by Craigie and by the addition to the vaccine in 1942 of the soluble specific substance discovered by Topping and Plotz. Results obtained with the earlier vaccine need not concern us here, although it is recalled that soldiers who received the original preparations were believed to have acquired some immunity. Tests with the improved vaccine, carried out by the U.S.A. Typhus Commission among Egyptians at Cairo in 1943 and 1944, showed definitely that while the vaccine did not protect against infection, it did produce a state of resistance that greatly ameliorated the disease. The vaccine came to be regarded chiefly as a mitigator and in a sense as insurance against fatality. The evidence indicates that the mild, often almost unrecognizable, cases among vaccinated American troops, and the absence of deaths were attributable to resistance acquired from vaccination.
Although it was shown that lice could be infected by feeding upon a vaccinated person suffering with typhus, there was no direct evidence that the spread of the disease was aided by the obscure, often unrecognizable, cases of typhus occurring among the vaccinated. It appears to be a reasonable assumption, on the other hand, that vaccination against typhus prevented an undeterminable number of infections. This inference, unprovable for lack of data, is drawn from the later knowledge that the exposure of American soldiers to louse-infested typhus victims exceeded all anticipation. This was true in Egypt, Iran, North Africa, Italy, Japan, and Korea, and possibly in Germany. In some of these areas there were estimated to be four or more times as many cases as those reported, indicating incidence in terms of tens of thousands of cases and consequently high risk of exposure. The degree of exposure of troops in the North African campaign was not well known until months after the landings of 1942. The fact that they had been vaccinated against typhus gave some measure of reassurance. Of course, how often the vaccine protected against infection, no one will ever know. An indication of what might have happened if vaccination had not been employed is given by the experiences of an unvaccinated British unit at a port at which vaccinated American soldiers were engaged in similar duties. Among these British troops there were 36 cases of typhus with a case fatality rate of 32 per cent. During the same period there were 9 mild cases among all American troops in North Africa and no deaths.
Reviewing the total experience at this date after the war, the field experience confirmed the opinion expressed at the National Research Council Conference on Typhus in June, 1944. This opinion is that while vaccination against epidemic louse-borne typhus does not always prevent infection, it causes the disease to be mild and appears to prevent death from typhus.
The use to be made of typhus vaccine in the control of an epidemic was a debatable question at one time. As it takes several weeks for the production of a serviceable state of immunity after the injection of the vaccine, it is obvious that immediate effects upon an outbreak would not be expected. A vaccination program carried out at the start, however, might be expected to make the decline of an epidemic more abrupt and certainly might be expected to save lives. In the author's opinion, the fear of aiding the spread of the disease by creation of many mild cases of typhus among the vaccinated is unwarranted, and without any proof from field experience. During the war it was agreed that vaccination should not be attempted on a mass scale among a population afflicted or immediately threatened with an epidemic, but had best be used for the immunization of all "key personnel," officials, clergy, bankers, transportation workers, and others rendering essential services, as well, of course, as all medical and sanitary personnel engaged in the work of control of the epidemic and care of the sick. Finally, it is not to be forgotten that one of the greatest values of vaccination against typhus is the protection of the workers in laboratories and plants where typhus vaccine is tested and manufactured. During the war and the first eight months following the surrender of Japan, from December 1943 to May 1946, the new preventive and control measures were applied with the backing of military authority against three epidemics of typhus fever among war-wracked civilian populations. The first test was in bombed, chaotic, overcrowded Naples from December 1943 to February 1944.'li The second was in the Inner Reich of Germany, in areas in which the typhus-ridden inmates from Nazi prison camps had scattered from March to June 1945.' The third was in disorganized Japan, flooded with repatriates coming in from Korea, in the winter of 1945 and early spring of 1946.' Conditions varied in each epidemic, but the principles of control were essentially the same as those laid down at the League of Nations Typhus Control Conference in 1937, namely, case finding, isolation of cases and regions (cordon sanitaire), delousing, and immunization. The methods and materials were the new products of work done during the war. These were chiefly organization and operation of units of trained personnel, mass delousing by dusting with DDT powder fully clothed civilians, some use of typhus vaccine, and the maintenance of the reporting systems that constitute medical intelligence. In each of these epidemics, the peak of cases was reached at a date earlier than would have been expected to occur in the absence of control measures, the number of cases was far less than reasonably might have been anticipated, the decline of the outbreaks was relatively abrupt, and the secondary foci or small coincident local outbreaks were promptly extinguished. The epidemiological data on which these statements are based are to be found in the publications cited. The conclusion is warranted that for the first time in the history of typhus in wartime, epidemics of the disease were brought under control and stopped before they had run their previously customary course.
The control of typhus fever achieved during World War II deserves to rank among the foremost achievements of military preventive medicine. The achievement freed military operations from the hampering effect which typhus in the past had exerted upon campaigns-an effect which had occasionally determined the outcome of a war. The significance of the achievement for civilian preventive medicine and public health is even greater. While the time may be long before typhus is eradicted from its ancient endemic regions, the statement may now be made with assurance that given the means and the will to use them no country need ever again suffer from a devastating epidemic of typhus fever.
There were peculiarities in the behavior of typhus fever between the wars, and these peculiarities should be noted as background against which to judge the claim that control of the disease was As we look at the total situation in retrospect we feel justified in saying that these things might have happened, but did not happen because great scientific advances in the knowledge of typhus and possible means of control had been made between the wars, and because vigorous co-operative actions were taken to speed up improvements and to apply effective preventive measures with the full force of military authority supported by democratic peoples united in a common purpose.
Many individuals, agencies, and organizations joined wholeheartedly in the wartime attack against typhus. The establishment of commissions to deal with special problems of national concern has been a time-honored procedure of the Government of the United States and other governments. In civilian experience, and in the experience of the Public Health Service, the Navy, and the Army, there are numerous examples of commissions established to investigate diseases 40YALE JOURNAL OF BIOLOGY AND.MEDICINE .. and to recommend and apply measures for their control. To cite cases from the experience of the Medical Department of the Army alone, particular mention may be made of the Yellow Fever Commission of 1901, the Pneumonia Board of 1918, and the Army Epidemiological Board of World War II. The Army Epidemiological Board, established in January 1941, as the result of plans and recommendations of General Simmons, "for the investigation and control of influenza and other epidemic diseases in the Army," had successfully combined expert civilian and military activities, and had been operating both as a War Department agency and as a division of Preventive Medicine Service of the Office of The Surgeon General. The establishment of the United States of America Typhus Commission was, therefore, in accordance with tradition and current practice. However, the U.S.A. Typhus Commission had some additional characteristics that were derived from the unusual potential dangers of typhus and from the economic and political history of this disease.
Executive Order No. 9285! was broadly conceived. It expressed the Government's realization of the importance of typhus fever as a threat to the safety of soldiers, a possible hindrance to military operations, and a probable cause of devastation among the civilian populations with which the armed forces were in contact and for which they would have dependency responsibilities under military government in liberated and occupied countries. In accordance with the estimate of the risks, the Executive Order gave the Commission commensurate scope, responsibilities, and authorizations, under the Secretary of War. It invoked and directed the assistance and support of the Commission by numerous military, executive, and governmental agencies to effectuate a program for the study and control of typhus fever both within and without the United States when typhus fever threatened or might threaten the military population. While making no change in the special activities of the Services, the Executive Order brought together the Army, Navy, and Public Health Service in a joint attack upon typhus. In language characteristic of a democracy even in war, the Order directed the Commission to "secure cooperation" and to "collaborate" with all appropriate organizations. This is not the place to summarize the staff studies that preceded the issuance of the Executive Order, or to outline the system of approvals and channels that had to be developed to handle the affairs of the Commission, or discuss the many personal and operational problems that were solved in one way or another. Suffice it to say that these were exhaustive, intricate, and novel to the extent that the Commission was anomalous among militarymedical agencies for which no previous provisions had been made.
The field of interest was interpreted to include epidemic (louse-borne) typhus, endemic (murine, flea-borne) typhus, and scrub typhus (miteborne) tsutsugamushi disease. Through this mandate, the Commission became engaged in the unforseen crises of a global war in all areas in which rickettsial diseases were a threat to military operations. The Commission, with headquarters in Washington, worked not only in the United States, but also in all the chief theaters of operations overseas. Some of the activities of the Commission will be briefly summarized because of their general interest and implications.
In a small way the Commission was an early example of unification of the Services. Its personnel, commissioned and non-commissioned, was detailed from the Army, Navy, and Public Health Service. It was a composite unit under the War Department. There was no great difficulty in the management of the affairs of officers and enlisted men, in accordance with the basic requirements of their respective Services while they were serving with the Commission.
Through Although the Commission had no budget of special appropriations, it was in a position to request and support requests for large expenditures for materials needed for typhus control. It assisted in obtaining priorities and funds for the rapid manufacture of DDT. It was instrumental in placing "firm requisitions" for millions of doses of typhus vaccine at a time when there was a risk that manufacture of the vaccine might have to be curtailed, with consequent dispersal of the specially trained and immunized personnel working on vaccine production at commercial plants. The Commission was able to expedite, at critical moments, the transportation by sea and air of supplies to combat typhus, and at all times to assist in the preparation and assemblage of anti-typhus supplies.
During the war the assembling and holding of trained expert personnel for particular purposes was a constant problem because of the general manpower needs of the country. Through the Commission it was possible to maintain a unit of experts on typhus and to preserve civilian laboratory organizations engaged in work on typhus.
Through privileges of representation of higher authority the Commission was able to assist in matters of general diplomatic and governmental nature. In addition to typhus materials returned to laboratories, specimens of rare plants and animals were sent from these stations to museums in this country. Furthermore, the Commission had the privilege of assisting in obtaining facilities and support for laboratory investigations of typhus in the United States and England.
In the episodes of the control of the typhus epidemics among the civilian populations in Naples, the Inner Reich, and in Japan, summarized above, are to be found the best examples of the value of such an organization as the Commission. Supported by military authority, and with the collaboration of other agencies, it served effectively in curbing these dangerous outbreaks of the disease.
While the material for this review has been drawn almost entirely from the experience of the United States of America Typhus Commission, the commentary has not been intended to be so centered. The details are to be regarded as illustrations of some of the general aspects and meaning of the control of typhus.
In the past typhus has determined the outcome of military campaigns and has affected the economy, morals, and social institutions of communities. As a result of control over the disease gained during World War II these effects of the disease need not occur again. The spectacular role of effective preventive medicine in a crisis is apt to be forgotten when the continuation of safeguards becomes the routine observance of familiar precautions. But the influence of preventive medicine upon the course of events persists and will remain a power, however inconspicuous, in keeping typhus within bounds. The restraint of typhus may be as effectively accomplished by national effort and international collaboration in peace as it was during the war. The results afford another example of the world-binding influence of international epidemiology and control of infectious disease. It is trusted that forces of peaceful international associations were strengthened by demonstrations of the control of typhus fever in World War II.
